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Abstract 
Karlsson, Loewenstein and Seppi (2009) found that, following market downswings, investors are less likely to 
login to monitor their retirement portfolios. They concluded that, rather like (apocryphal) ostriches sticking their 
heads in the sand, investors avoid unpleasant information by reducing portfolio monitoring in response to news 
of negative market movement. We apply generalized non-linear mixed effects models to test for this selective 
information monitoring at an individual level in a new sample of active online investors. We see different 
behavior in this new sample. We find that investors increase their portfolio monitoring following both positive 
and daily negative market returns, behaving more like hyper-vigilant meerkats than head-in-the-sand ostriches.  
This pattern persists for logins not resulting in trades and weekend logins when markets are closed. Moreover, 
an investor personality trait – neuroticism - attenuates the pattern of portfolio monitoring suggesting that 
market–driven variation in portfolio monitoring is attributable to psychological factors. 
 
Keywords:  
Behavioral finance, individual investors, selective attention, personality, investment decisions, ostrich effect   
 
JEL Classification  
D81, D82, G02, G14 
3 
 
1. Introduction  
A standard assumption of the economics of information is that we should place value on information to the 
extent that it serves as input to decisions that enable us to obtain desired outcomes. However, recent studies 
have suggested that we can also value information for its own sake, and derive positive and negative utility 
directly from information. Loewenstein (2006) discusses cases where individuals seek out or avoid additional 
information conditional on their expectations of how such information will make them feel, independent of its 
informational value. For example, in the medical domain Loewenstein, Read and Baumeister (2003) describe 
how people choose not to book an appointment to see a doctor in order to avoid receiving potentially threatening 
information about their medical condition even if such information could potentially provide information that 
would improve the quality of their health and wellbeing. Recent studies in neuroscience (Berns et al. 2006) 
show that regions of the brain that are activated during the experience of a painful electric shock are also 
activated in individuals anticipating the impending painful experience. The brain activation increases as the time 
of the shock approaches - behavior consistent with the notion that the information that one is going to receive an 
electric shock is, like the shock itself, a source of misery. Indeed, thinking about the shock was so unpleasant 
that subjects in this study preferred more pain - a higher voltage shock - in order to reduce the time they spent 
dreading the impending shock.   
As well as avoiding negative information people may seek out and relish positive information. Ehrilch 
et al. (1957) found that owners who recently purchased cars were more attentive to advertisements for the model 
which they bought compared to the other models they had considered buying. Similarly, Brock and Balloun 
(1967) found that smokers made more effort to listen to pro-smoking messages than non-smokers, and non-
smokers made more effort to listen to a message affirming the link between smoking and lung cancer than 
smokers. The evidence indicates that, for both positive and negative information, people seek out or avoid 
information contingent on their expectation of its hedonic impact.   
A recent study by Karlsson, Loewenstein and Seppi (2009) has found evidence that people selectively 
seek out and avoid information in a behavioral finance context. Given that the hedonic disutility of attending to 
bad news may outweigh its informational benefits, Karlsson et al. (2009) built a model that brings together 
information acquisition and hedonic utility of information. The model predicts that individuals rapidly seek out 
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definitive information given positive news and avoid information in the face of adverse news or in other words, 
that they will have asymmetric preferences for the timing and resolution of uncertainty. 
In their study Karlsson et al. (2009) explored two datasets. The first dataset from the Swedish Premium 
Pension Authority represented Swedish citizens’ investments in equity and interest-bearing funds for their 
pensions aggregated across all clients. The second dataset, provided by Vanguard Group, one of the largest 
investment management companies, aggregated American investors who primarily had personal 401(k) plans - 
retirement savings plans that can be invested into various funds. In both datasets the authors found that investors 
selectively attended to information, as shown by portfolio monitoring increasing with rising markets. Karlsson 
et al. (2009) reported evidence that investors check the value of their portfolios more frequently following 
positive market movements. In the US dataset prior averaged market return1 of 1% increased the daily mean 
number of logins by 5-6% and in the Swedish dataset by 1%.  
Borrowing from an earlier study by Galai and Sade (2006), Karlsson et al. (2009) termed this pattern of 
information monitoring the ostrich effect. Galai and Sade’s (2006) identification of the ostrich effect stems from 
their finding that the return on liquid assets was greater than that on equally risky illiquid assets and that this 
difference in returns was higher in periods of greater uncertainty. Galai and Sade (2006) attributed this 
observation to investors’ willingness to pay a premium for the “bliss of ignorance” (p. 2758). Under a standard 
economic account people should demand a higher return for the illiquid assets, all other things being equal. The 
finding of the opposite pattern suggests that both because information about losses is particularly painful, and 
because information about the performance of illiquid assets is less accessible, investors are more willing to 
hold illiquid assets. Accordingly, Galai and Sade (2006) attributed investors’ preference for illiquid assets over 
equally risky liquid assets to the avoidance of potentially negative or uncertain information. 
More recently, using the same dataset as Karlsson et al. (2009), Sicherman, Loewenstein, Seppi and 
Utkus (2013) have extended the analysis of Vanguard clients’ (mostly 401k) accounts over the 2007-2008 
period to an individual account-level introducing a non-linear function (cf. Karlsson et al. 2009, who used a 
linear function) to relate market returns to logins to examine possible differences between the effect of positive 
                       
1
 Karlsson et al. (2009) define prior averaged market returns as the log change in the index relative to the average index level over the 
previous 4 days. 
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and negative returns. Sicherman et al. (2013) confirmed the ostrich effect reporting a significant negative 
coefficient on a “down Dow” dummy variable which indicated whether the Dow index went down on the 
previous day. However, they found no corresponding increase in monitoring when the Dow increased; in fact 
monitoring slightly decreased across the range of positive returns. They confirmed the ostrich effect for negative 
market returns at both an aggregate and individual level; although many individual accounts had too few logins 
to enable detection of any effect, about 14% of their sample showed a significant return / login relation and, of 
these, 79% of investors showed the ostrich effect, while 21% were “anti” ostriches as they had the opposite 
response to the market returns (increasing logins given negative market returns). Moreover, consistent with the 
view that the ostrich effect has a psychological basis, Sicherman et al. (2013) find that ostrich behavior is a 
relatively stable personal characteristic over time; individuals who displayed ostrich behavior in 2007 were 
more likely to display ostrich behavior in 2008.  
In this study we test the effects of market returns on individual investors’ portfolio monitoring 
decisions in a new data set. Our data set is from 617 UK private individuals investing in equities from 2004-
2009, and contrasts with the Vanguard and Swedish Premium Pension Authority investors allocating into 
pension funds in 2007-2008. We consider the effects of positive and negative daily market returns separately 
over a 6 year time period. To preview our results, like Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman et al. (2013), we 
find that login behavior depends on market returns, but in our data the dependency is quite different. Rather than 
the ostrich effect pattern, where people login less after recent negative market returns, we find what we term a 
meerkat effect in which people login more, not less, in response to recent negative returns -  as well as to 
positive returns.   
In attempting to understand why login behavior should vary as a function of market returns we assume 
that investor logins may be motivated by different intentions. They may login to trade or merely for portfolio 
information. Regardless of a trader’s intentions both of these kinds of login could result in a trade - or not. In our 
modelling as well as considering all logins, we also consider just the subset of logins that did not result in a 
trade. This is because although logins that did not result in a trade do not necessarily reflect hedonic monitoring, 
these transaction-free logins can be considered more likely to reflect informational portfolio monitoring. We 
find that, for such non-trade logins investors increase their portfolio monitoring given both positive and negative 
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daily market returns. To test this idea further we analyse weekend logins, days when investors cannot transact. 
We again find investors increase their portfolio monitoring for both positive and negative daily market returns - 
a meerkat effect. The fact that non-trade logins increase with positive daily market returns is consistent with the 
idea that investors seek - and gain - hedonic utility directly from positive information.  However our findings of 
increased logins with negative market returns for daily non-trade logins and weekend logins are again the 
opposite of the ostrich effect for negative market returns found by Sicherman et al. (2013). 
Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman et al. (2013) propose that the ostrich effect is attributable to 
psychological factors, and our study was originally planned to seek corroborative evidence for this notion by 
exploring the possibility of a link between the psychological trait of neuroticism and individual differences in 
login behavior.  The personality trait of neuroticism is associated with high levels of anxiety. While anxiety can 
be a mood or an emotion, trait neuroticism describes individual differences in base-line levels of anxiety; indeed 
some authors refer to anxiety as a personality trait (Wilt, Oehlberg & Revelle 2011). Neuroticism is one of the 
major human personality traits identified in the five factor model of personality (Costa & McRae 1992) and as 
more neurotic individuals experience greater anxiety and worry (Mathews, Deary & Whiteman 2003), we 
envisaged that this would be reflected in their reactions to negative market returns.  In order to investigate the 
psychological basis of the ostrich effect, we construct a measure of the neuroticism personality trait for each 
investor and test whether investors’ level of neuroticism interacts with the effect of daily market returns on 
logins. We hypothesise that there will be individual differences in logins conditional on the daily market returns. 
The next section introduces our dataset, definitions of variables, descriptive statistics and the generalized mixed 
effects model. Section 3 presents the results. In Section 4 we introduce the trait of neuroticism and its interaction 
with the meerkat effect. Discussion is presented in Section 5.  
 
2. Dataset and Methodology 
2.1 Data and sample characteristics 
We study 617 clients from Barclays Wealth Management. For each client we have their logins and trading 
records over a 6 year period (2004-2009) and their self-reported demographics derived from a survey of the 
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same 617 investors.  The survey was conducted in a series of waves from September 2008 to December 2009 in 
order to explore investors’ attitudes and disposition in relation to financial markets that were of interest to 
Barclays Wealth Management research objectives. As an incentive to participate in the survey respondents were 
promised a summary of the research findings. Overall, such survey methodology has become an important 
addition to finance (Graham & Harvey 2001, Lins, Servaes & Tufano 2010).   
In this study our sample of investors was selected based on the activity and wealth of individual 
investors. Those with more than 1 trade per year and those with portfolio value of more than £1000 were invited 
to participate in the survey with a total of 19,251 of their clients invited to take part in an online survey via 
email. 4,520 clients opened the email and 849 proceeded to the on-line questionnaire survey. 617 clients 
completed the survey, which is in the same range of response rate as in similar studies by Dorn and Huberman 
(2005) and Glaser and Weber (2007).   
Figure 1 provides demographic distributions of the panel sample of our 617 investors who took part in 
the survey and includes investors’ age, number of dependents, investable wealth, income and marital status and 
the demographic survey questions. To identify potential selection biases, we compared survey participants to an 
adult British population based on the data reported by the Office for National Statistics. Overall our 617 
investors have above average incomes compared to the British population; while the mean British income is 
around £30,000 our sample has a mean of £76,616 and a median of £60,000. 84% of the sample are the prime 
financial (investment and savings) decision makers of the household. The average age of survey participants is 
51 years, four years older than the average British adult. Survey participants are also more likely to be married 
(0.74 vs. 0.52) or male (0.93 vs. 0.49) compared to the British average. Although our respondents are not 
representative of the typical British adult, their demographics are in-line with private investor populations 
analysed in other studies (Dorn & Huberman 2005).  
Figure 2 plots the distributions of the daily market returns as measured by FTSE100 Index, the average 
daily number of logins per investor and the daily average number of logins per investor excluding those logins 
that resulted in a trade, or as we refer to, informational / hedonic logins. Investors in the sample login on 37% of 
the trading days. Figure 3 is a raw scatter plot of aggregate number of daily logins and daily market returns; the 
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locally weighted scatterplot smoothing line clearly indicates non-linearity in the data showing increased logins 
responses to both market gains and losses.  
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Figure 1. Demographics distributions: investors’ age, number of dependents investors have, marital status, investable wealth and income. 
The survey questions were phrased as follows: How old are you? How many dependents do you have? What is your marital status? (Single; 
Married; Divorced; Widowed; Cohabitating). What is the approximate total value of all of your investable wealth - your stocks, bonds, 
investment funds, derivatives and cash holdings? What is your expected gross annual income for this year?  
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Figure 2. FTSE100 Index and logins distributions (trading days): FTSE100 Index ranging from January 2004 to December 2009 to match 
the transactions data, average daily logins per investor, average daily logins per investor excluding logins that resulted in a trade. Daily 
Market Returns = (FTSE100 Price (t) - FTSE100 Price (t-1)) / FTSE100 Price (t-1) . Closing prices are applied. 
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Figure 3. Aggregate logins and daily returns: The scatter plot shows the aggregate number of daily logins of our sample of investors and the 
daily FTSE100 returns with locally weighted scatterplot smoothing line. 
 
2.2 Models: 
Our data allows us to measure investors’ portfolio monitoring behavior at an individual rather than the aggregate 
level. While we later describe analyses of logins that did not result in trades our first analysis includes all trading 
day logins. All models in this study include the full sample of 617 investors. Given that we have count data (the 
number of logins) we use a Poisson model and because we have repeated measures for each client we use a 
mixed effects model. This Poisson mixed effects model has random intercepts to account for each investor’s 
propensity to login to their portfolio and random slopes to account for individuals’ sensitivity to daily market 
returns. To directly test the sensitivity of investors’ login behavior to changes in daily market returns separately 
for positive and negative domains, we use two dummy variables to indicate the sign of daily market returns, one 
to indicate a positive return (Up-Dummy) and one to indicate a negative return (Down-Dummy). We control for 
days of the week, age, gender, income, marital status and whether the individual is the prime financial decision 
maker in the household. We exclude weekends and holidays from the first part of the analysis as the stock 
market is closed therefore allowing us to focus on trading days; we consider weekend monitoring behavior in a 
later section 3.5. We fit four models. The first model uses daily market returns - returns between yesterday’s and 
today’s closing price - as the independent variable. The second model uses a 5-day moving average of daily 
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market returns and the third model uses a 20-day moving average. The 5-day market return is the average of 
daily market returns for the week. For example if today is a Wednesday, the 5-day returns calculation would 
include daily market returns on the last Thursday though today. A similar method is used for the 20-day market 
returns calculation. It makes sense to look at market returns over several time periods: a  recent daily return, a 
week’s average return and a month’s average return could cause varied portfolio monitoring behavior. The 
fourth model includes previous day’s logins since a login on Tuesday might not be independent from a login on 
Monday. All four models gave very similar results. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Daily Market Returns 
The results in Table 1 show coefficients from our four Poisson mixed effects models. Across all models there 
are more logins on Mondays and Tuesdays compared to the rest of the trading days (Friday was the baseline in 
our regressions). There is also a significant gender effect in all models with males logging in more frequently, 
which is consistent with Sicherman et al.’s (2013) results. In Model 1, the significant positive coefficient for the 
interaction between daily market returns and the dummy for positive returns (Returns×Up-Dummy) indicates 
that given an increase in daily market returns investors monitor their portfolios more. The significant negative 
coefficient for the interaction between daily market returns and the dummy for negative daily market returns 
(Returns×Down-Dummy) indicates that the pattern is significantly different in the loss domain. Investors login 
more often with increasingly positive daily market returns and more, not less, after increasingly negative daily 
market returns. We call the increased monitoring as a function of increasing absolute daily market returns the 
meerkat effect2 because investors increase their monitoring given changes. A t-test confirms that the absolute 
steepness of the slopes is significantly different (p<.001) in positive and negative domains. In summary, 
investors increase portfolio monitoring given both positive and negative daily market returns. The observed 
increase in portfolio monitoring given positive daily market returns is consistent with the ostrich effect; 
however, the increase in logins for negative daily market returns (relative to zero returns) is not consistent with 
what would be expected from an aversion to negative information.  
                       
2
 Typically one meerkat is on guard duty. Once faced with danger all meerkats come up and immediately begin jumping and growling. 
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3.2 Past Daily Market Returns 
Model 2 replicates the analysis of Model 1, but replaces the daily market returns with the 5-day moving average, 
and we find the same significant meerkat effect – that is increased portfolio monitoring for both positive and 
negative market returns. Model 3 uses a 20-day moving average instead of the 5-day moving average and again 
we find the same significant pattern. Model 4 extends Model 1 by including a lagged login and it is consistent 
with the previous three models and shows that those investors who are more likely to login in the past are more 
likely to login today. 
 
Table 1 
 
  
     
Poisson Models of All Weekday Logins    
  
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
Daily Ret P Value 5-day Ret P Value 20-day Ret P Value Login lag P Value 
(Intercept) -1.004 0.007 -0.959 0.011 -0.949 0.011 -1.153 0.001 
Monday 0.047 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.039 0.000 
Tuesday 0.011 0.008 0.015 0.000 0.011 0.007 0.018 0.000 
Wednesday -0.011 0.008 -0.009 0.023 -0.012 0.004 -0.012 0.004 
Thursday -0.002 0.692 -0.007 0.096 -0.007 0.067 -0.002 0.592 
Age -0.004 0.383 -0.004 0.365 -0.004 0.361 -0.004 0.327 
Decision Maker -0.011 0.899 -0.011 0.901 -0.011 0.901 -0.014 0.867 
Gender (Male) 0.615 0.011 0.611 0.012 0.611 0.012 0.563 0.011 
Income 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.027 
Married -0.009 0.957 -0.007 0.965 -0.007 0.967 0.008 0.959 
Divorced -0.149 0.596 -0.147 0.602 -0.146 0.603 -0.126 0.622 
Widowed 0.109 0.803 0.114 0.794 0.115 0.794 0.181 0.651 
Cohabitating 0.373 0.118 0.374 0.117 0.374 0.117 0.337 0.121 
Returns×Up 
Dummy 5.758 0.000 
    
5.504 0.000 
Returns×Down 
Dummy -2.207 0.000 
    
-1.567 0.000 
Return 5-days×Up Dummy 
 
4.997 0.000 
    
Return 5-days×Down Dummy -1.669 0.000 
    
Return 20-days×Up Dummy 
 
 
2.088 0.003 
  
Return 20-days×Down Dummy 
 
 
-4.620 0.000 
  
Login 1 day lag           0.142 0.000 
Marginal R2 1.2%   1.2%   1.2%   3.0% 
Conditional R2 48%   48%   48%   45% 
Note: The marginal R2 describes the proportion of variance explained by the fixed factor(s) alone. The conditional R2 describes the 
proportion of variance explained by both the fixed and random factors. 
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3.3 Hedonic monitoring 
When people login they may do so with the intention of monitoring only or the intention of trading, and then 
once logged in, then can trade or not. Thus we have a 2x2 table of scenarios: (i) intending to trade and then 
trading, (ii) intending to trade but not trading, (iii) intending to monitor but then trading, and (iv) intending to 
monitor and then not trading. Of course, unfortunately, we do not know the intention at login, only the result - 
either a trade or not. We differentiate between portfolio logins for trading purposes versus pure informational 
purposes to explore the psychological effects of information. As non-trade logins can be considered more likely 
to reflect informational portfolio monitoring we subtract days with logins that resulted in a trade (trading days) 
from the dataset for each investor and conduct similar analyses as above to test the relationship between login 
days not involving transactions and daily market returns.  Karlsson et al. (2009) addressed this issue by using 
the number of account logins less the number of portfolio reallocations in the Swedish dataset and aggregate 
S&P 500 trading volume as a proxy to control for transactional logins in the Vanguard dataset. Sicherman et al. 
(2013) also controlled for how much investors trade and performed analyses of weekend logins, which we 
consider in a later section.  
Table 2 reports results from our four non-trade logins Poisson models. The Returns×Up-Dummy 
coefficients are, as before, significantly positive across all four model specifications suggesting investors’ 
increased demand for positive information given rising markets.  The fact that there are logins that do not result 
in trades is not, by itself, necessarily indicative of hedonic monitoring. However the observed increase in non-
trade logins as a function of rising markets does support the notion that investors seek and obtain positive utility 
directly from information. Investors are more likely to monitor their portfolio given rising markets.  
Given falling markets, the significant Returns×Down-Dummy coefficient in Model 1 implies that in 
response to daily market decreases, investors increasingly seek-out information; this is counter to the ostrich 
effect supporting our coining of the term meerkat effect. Model 4, which is similar to Model 1, but includes a 
term to control for the influence of logins on the previous day, also shows a meerkat effect. This model also 
shows that investors’ login decisions are not independent of their logins the day before.  However, Model 2 (the 
5-day average return specification) shows the opposite pattern for these non-trade logins to that observed when 
logins involving trades were included. Instead of the meerkat effect there is a mild ostrich effect, such that with 
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increasingly negative returns fewer non-trade logins are made. This possibly reflects the fact that because there 
is a larger proportion of logins that result in a trade when market declines (cf. Figure 4) there would be fewer 
opportunities for investors to record login days without trading over the 5-day period. Figure 4 shows a plot of 
the proportion of trades given a login across daily market returns and confirms that in falling markets investors’ 
logins are increasingly likely to result in transactions; for rising markets the increase in transactions per login is 
not so steep. Model 3 (the 20-day return specification) shows that when the market declined over the previous 
month, investor logins without trades do not vary from their baseline level. 
  
Table 2 
 
 
      
Poisson Models of Non-Trades Weekday Logins  
  
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
Daily Ret P Value 5-day Ret P Value 20-day Ret P Value Login lag P Value 
(Intercept) -1.297 0.001 -1.260 0.001 -1.253 0.002 -1.712 0.000 
Monday 0.047 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.075 0.000 
Tuesday 0.018 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.020 0.067 
Wednesday -0.002 0.678 -0.002 0.724 -0.003 0.493 -0.015 0.166 
Thursday 0.007 0.145 0.002 0.586 0.002 0.677 0.003 0.803 
Age -0.003 0.570 -0.003 0.549 -0.003 0.544 -0.002 0.753 
Decision Maker 0.005 0.957 0.005 0.954 0.005 0.954 -0.015 0.868 
Gender (Male) 0.604 0.018 0.600 0.019 0.600 0.019 0.566 0.022 
Income 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.015 
Married -0.002 0.989 -0.002 0.993 -0.001 0.994 -0.108 0.520 
Divorced -0.111 0.708 -0.109 0.714 -0.109 0.714 -0.207 0.469 
Widowed -0.055 0.905 -0.049 0.916 -0.049 0.916 -0.100 0.823 
Cohabitating 0.409 0.103 0.409 0.103 0.409 0.103 0.195 0.421 
Returns× Up 
Dummy 5.399 0.000 
    
9.685 0.000 
Returns× Down 
Dummy -0.447 0.007 
    
-2.104 0.000 
Return 5-days×Up Dummy 5.431 0.000 
    Return 5-days×Down Dummy 1.828 0.000 
    
Return 20-days×Up Dummy 
  
4.887 0.000 
  
Return 20-days×Down Dummy 
  
0.376 0.638 
  
Login 1 day lag           1.712 0.000 
Marginal R2 1.2%   1.2%   1.2%   16% 
Conditional R2 51%   51%   51%   57% 
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Figure 4. The plot shows proportion of daily trades given a login for daily market returns with bars showing the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
3.4 Robustness tests 
Because the system automatically logs-off inactive investors, multiple logins per day do not necessarily indicate 
a greater interest in portfolio monitoring; the most active investors could login just once and remain logged in - 
and monitoring - all day, while investors with a higher number of logins might be monitoring less and so being 
repeatedly logged out. For these reasons we tested a logit mixed effects model with a binary dependant variable 
for daily portfolio monitoring – measuring a login if an investor logged into his account any number of times on 
that day or no-login if an investor did not login on that day. As previously, we fitted four models for all logins 
(Table 3) and for non-trade logins (Table 4). Table 3 reports similar results to the Poisson models reported in 
Table 1 except that the returns and Down-Dummy interaction coefficients for Model 3 and Model 4 are non-
significant. Results of the non-trade logins logit regressions in Table 4 are similar to the corresponding Poisson 
model specifications in Table 2 – except the returns and Down-Dummy interaction variable for Model 4 is non-
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significant. Though some effects are not significant over longer averaged returns the different criterion for 
logins tested with the logit models does not change the overall pattern of effects we observe.  
 
Table 3 
 
 
      
Logit Models of All Weekday Logins  
  
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
Daily Ret P Value 5-day Ret P Value 20-day Ret P Value Login lag P Value 
(Intercept) -1.061 0.029 -0.991 0.041 -0.973 0.045 -1.430 0.000 
Monday 0.063 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.039 0.000 
Tuesday 0.040 0.000 0.049 0.000 -0.003 0.771 -0.012 0.010 
Wednesday -0.001 0.885 0.002 0.843 0.041 0.000 -0.006 0.186 
Thursday 0.004 0.689 -0.002 0.816 -0.002 0.862 0.003 0.477 
Age -0.002 0.774 -0.002 0.742 -0.002 0.733 -0.003 0.487 
Decision Maker -0.022 0.847 -0.022 0.851 -0.022 0.850 0.000 0.999 
Gender (Male) 0.687 0.029 0.683 0.030 0.681 0.030 0.552 0.018 
Income 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.028 
Married -0.134 0.533 -0.133 0.536 -0.132 0.537 0.010 0.949 
Divorced -0.276 0.450 -0.272 0.457 -0.271 0.458 -0.097 0.720 
Widowed -0.149 0.794 -0.140 0.806 -0.138 0.808 0.010 0.982 
Cohabitating 0.253 0.413 0.252 0.415 0.252 0.415 0.365 0.112 
Returns×Up 
Dummy 9.221 0.000 
    
5.293 0.000 
Returns×Down 
Dummy -3.954 0.000 
    
-0.050 0.768 
Return 5-days×Up Dummy 10.380 0.000 
    Return 5-days×Down Dummy -1.839 0.019 
    
Return 20-days×Up Dummy 
  
9.784 0.000 
  
Return 20-days×Down Dummy 
  
-2.805 0.111 
  
Login 1 day lag           0.150 0.000 
Marginal R2 1.3%   1.2%   1.2%   3.0% 
Conditional R2 62%   61%   61%   48% 
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Table 4 
 
 
      
Logit Models of Non-Trades Weekday Logins  
  
Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Daily Ret P Value 5-day Ret P Value 20-day Ret P Value Login lag P Value 
(Intercept) -1.295 0.009 -1.231 0.013 -1.221 0.014 -1.902 0.000 
Monday 0.059 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.063 0.000 
Tuesday 0.048 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.007 0.514 0.029 0.012 
Wednesday 0.011 0.295 0.014 0.202 0.050 0.000 -0.003 0.792 
Thursday 0.013 0.222 0.008 0.474 0.011 0.318 0.012 0.299 
Age -0.001 0.868 -0.001 0.836 -0.001 0.834 -0.001 0.834 
Decision Maker -0.008 0.949 -0.007 0.952 -0.007 0.953 -0.003 0.977 
Gender (Male) 0.662 0.039 0.654 0.041 0.653 0.042 0.539 0.035 
Income 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.014 
Married -0.132 0.547 -0.131 0.550 -0.131 0.551 -0.107 0.541 
Divorced -0.246 0.510 -0.243 0.515 -0.242 0.516 -0.181 0.542 
Widowed -0.260 0.655 -0.255 0.662 -0.253 0.664 -0.221 0.633 
Cohabitating 0.279 0.378 0.278 0.380 0.278 0.379 0.225 0.371 
Returns×Up Dummy 8.683 0.000 
    
9.311 0.000 
Returns×Down 
Dummy -2.105 0.000 
    
-0.413 0.326 
Return 5-days×Up Dummy 11.080 0.000 
    Return 5-days×Down Dummy 2.265 0.007 
    
Return 20-days×Up Dummy 
  
12.500 0.000 
  
Return 20-days×Down Dummy 
  
2.431 0.199 
  
Login 1 day lag           1.675 0.000 
Marginal R2 1.3%   1.2%   1.2%   15% 
Conditional R2 62%   62%   62%   57% 
 
 
3.5 Weekend Monitoring 
Our second strategy for examining psychological effects of information is to use weekend logins. As the market 
is closed at weekends we assume weekend logins will not be motivated by any intent to trade; with the 
exception of placing limit orders and market orders for immediate execution once the market opens, investors 
will be restricted to monitoring. Accordingly we investigated weekend logins using similar models as reported 
in previous sections.  Treating the weekend as one period Table 5 reports results for weekend logins regressed 
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on the previous Friday’s returns using both Poisson and logit models (Model 1a and Model 1b).  For the logit 
model we measured a login if an investor logged into his account any number of times on that weekend 
(Saturday or Sunday) or no-login if an investor did not login on that weekend. 
Across both models we find support for the meerkat effect as investors significantly increase 
monitoring given both positive and negative market returns. We also used a similar strategy to test the effect of 
the previous week’s returns on weekend monitoring behavior in Model 2a (Poisson) and 2b (logit).  The only 
significant coefficient for these two models is a negative significant coefficient for the 5-day Return×Up- 
Dummy in Model 2a indicating that when the week is looking good investors chose not to monitor at the 
weekend – counter to both the meerkat and ostrich effects.  This finding is difficult to interpret and different to 
what we have observed for the 5-day return on trading days – with or without excluding non-trade logins. 
 
Table 5 
        Weekend Logins 
              
  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2a  Model 2b 
  Poisson P Value Logit P value Poisson  P Value Logit P value 
(Intercept) -2.212 0.000 -2.607 0.000 -2.172 0.000 -2.545 0.000 
Age 0.008 0.088 0.011 0.036 0.008 0.093 0.011 0.040 
Decision Maker -0.003 0.967 0.011 0.908 -0.002 0.984 0.012 0.901 
Gender (Male) 0.342 0.137 0.479 0.066 0.339 0.140 0.476 0.068 
Income 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.011 
Married -0.197 0.204 -0.180 0.304 -0.195 0.208 -0.179 0.306 
Divorced -0.679 0.011 -0.668 0.026 -0.668 0.012 -0.665 0.027 
Widowed -0.231 0.576 -0.279 0.550 -0.223 0.589 -0.272 0.560 
Cohabitating 0.271 0.224 0.317 0.209 0.267 0.231 0.316 0.210 
Returns×Up Dummy 1.928 0.011 4.279 0.000 
    Returns×Down 
Dummy -3.013 0.000 -4.835 0.000 
    
Returns 5-days×Up Dummy 
  
-5.481 0.002 -3.019 0.273 
Returns 5-days× Down Dummy     -0.150 0.915 -0.058 0.979 
Marginal R2 1.7%   1.8%   1.7%   1.8% 
Conditional R2 45%   51%   45%   51% 
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3.6 Double Weekend Logins 
If investors login and check their accounts on Saturday and then login again on Sunday, Sicherman et al. (2013) 
hypothesize they are doing this more for psychological reasons rather than purely to get additional portfolio 
information since prices have not changed. Accordingly, like Sicherman et al. (2013), we investigated double 
weekend logins by fitting a logit model with 1= login happened consecutively on a Saturday and a Sunday and 0 
otherwise. Results are reported in Table 6. A model regressed on the previous Friday’s returns (Model A) shows 
a meerkat effect – double weekend logins increased for both increasing and decreasing Friday returns. No 
significant effects on double weekend logins were measurable based on the average market returns over the 
prior 5-day period (Model B).   
 
Table 6  
   
Double Logins 
      
  
Model A 
Friday Returns P value 
Model B 
Week Returns P value 
(Intercept) -4.859 0.000 -4.826 0.000 
Age -0.004 0.661 -0.004 0.607 
Decision Maker 0.001 0.995 0.003 0.988 
Gender (Male) 0.699 0.163 0.716 0.156 
Income 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.014 
Married 
-0.537 0.066 -0.485 0.100 
Divorced 
-0.907 0.068 -0.826 0.098 
Widowed 
-0.503 0.533 -0.403 0.619 
Cohabitating 0.054 0.891 0.118 0.765 
Returns×Up Dummy 5.549 0.081 
  Returns×Down Dummy 
-6.438 0.007 
  
Returns 5-days×Up Dummy 
 
-8.024 0.285 
Returns 5-days×Down Dummy -5.916 0.304 
Marginal R2 2.7%   3.6% 
Conditional R2 65%   65% 
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4. Psychology of selective attention 
4.1 Neuroticism 
 
The psychological evidence that motives and expectations impinge upon human perception to the extent that 
people’s attention and information gathering are influenced by the emotional content of information has been 
accumulating since the 1940s. For example Postman, Bruner and McGinnis (1948) observed that individuals 
subconsciously raised the sensory thresholds for the conscious recognition of “unacceptable stimulus objects” 
terming the phenomenon perceptual defence. Exploring this phenomenon further McGinnis (1949) measured 
participants' psychophysiological indicators (galvanic skin response) to assess people's emotional reactions and 
found that there was a selective emotional response to threatening stimuli - but not neutral ones. McGinnis 
concluded that: "perceptual defence is designed to delay the greater anxiety that accompanies actual recognition 
of the stimulus" (p.250). Anxiety is directly associated with a trait of neuroticism (Mathews, Deary & Whiteman 
2003). Trait neuroticism describes individual differences in base-line levels of anxiety; indeed some authors 
refer to anxiety as a personality trait (Wilt et al. 2011). As earlier research has found that more neurotic people 
tend to be more perceptually defensive (e.g. Watt & Morris 1995) we hypothesize that the trait of neuroticism 
plays a role in portfolio monitoring behavior. At the time of planning this study we envisaged we would 
replicate the ostrich effect and then be able to measure its association with neuroticism. Such a result would 
offer direct corroboration of Karlsson et al.’s (2009) suggestion, that variation in portfolio monitoring with 
market returns is attributable to psychological factors. Although we have not replicated the ostrich effect, the 
rationale for studying the relationship between personality and variation in portfolio monitoring with market 
returns applies equally well to the meerkat effect. Indeed, some authors have proposed that the attentional 
system of anxious individuals is abnormally sensitive to threat-related stimuli and that these individuals tend to 
direct their attention toward threatening information (Williams, Watt, MacLeod & Matthews 1988).  
 
4.2 Survey  
The single measure of neuroticism was reported by the 617 investors as part of the survey questions collected by 
Barclays Wealth Management. Although the survey was conducted during turbulent financial times, it is well 
evidenced that personality traits are stable in adulthood and are seen as important inputs into social and 
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economic outcomes by both psychologists and economists (Cobb-Clark & Shrurer 2011; Heineck & Anger 
2010; Mueller & Plug 2006; Nyhus & Pons 2005). In the survey, which is based on the five-factor model of 
personality inventory (Costa & McRae 1992), each investor responded on a 1-7 Likert scale (labelled 1 
“strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree”; 4 was labelled “neither agree or disagree”) to four personality 
statements. The resulting scores ranged from 4 to 28 points and then were scaled to have a mean of 0 and 
standard deviation of 1. Figure 5 reports the distribution of neuroticism and the survey statements used to 
construct the measure. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of trait neuroticism from least neurotic to most neurotic (scaled). Survey questions include the following:  I am not 
easily bothered by things. I fear for the worst. I get stressed easily. Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious or stressed. 
 
 
 
4.3 Personality Results 
We apply similar analysis as in Section 3 using mixed effects with neuroticism added as a fixed effect variable 
into the model. As a robustness check we carried out both Poisson and logit regressions. As before, we also 
consider models with all logins and models with logins that did not result in a trade separately. Table 7 reports 
results for four models using the daily returns specification as in Model 1 in Section 3. The first and second 
columns report Poisson and logit models respectively with all logins. The third and fourth columns report 
Poisson and logit models with logins that did not result in a trade.  The coefficient for Neurotic is negative but 
non-significant across all models, however of interest is the significant interaction between neuroticism and 
negative market returns (Returns×Neurotic×Down-Dummy) across all model specifications; the rate of increase 
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in monitoring with negative market returns we characterise as the meerkat effect is more extreme for neurotic 
investors.  
For positive market returns all logins and non-trade logins show that the rate of increase in logins is 
gentler for more neurotic investors. However this interaction is only significant for the Poisson model 
specifications (Models 1a and 1c). Figure 6 plots the fixed effects of returns, neuroticism, and their interactions 
from Model 1a.  
 
Table 7 
  
     
Poisson and Logit Models of Weekday Logins with Neuroticism 
  Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d 
  
Poisson 
All logins P Value 
logit 
All logins P Value 
Poisson 
Non-Trade Logins P Value 
logit 
Non-Trade Logins P Value 
(Intercept) -1.005 0.007 -1.064 0.028 -1.298 0.001 -1.293 0.009 
Monday 0.047 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.059 0.000 
Tuesday 0.011 0.008 0.040 0.000 0.007 0.146 0.013 0.223 
Wednesday -0.011 0.008 -0.001 0.886 0.018 0.000 0.048 0.000 
Thursday -0.002 0.691 0.004 0.689 -0.002 0.673 0.011 0.295 
Age -0.004 0.416 -0.001 0.828 -0.003 0.596 -0.001 0.905 
Decision Maker -0.013 0.888 -0.025 0.832 0.004 0.964 -0.010 0.936 
Gender (Male) 0.602 0.013 0.669 0.033 0.595 0.020 0.645 0.045 
Income 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.012 
Married -0.005 0.977 -0.128 0.550 -0.001 0.997 -0.127 0.561 
Divorced -0.145 0.605 -0.269 0.461 -0.109 0.713 -0.241 0.518 
Widowed 0.094 0.831 -0.172 0.763 -0.066 0.887 -0.279 0.632 
Cohabitating 0.379 0.112 0.261 0.399 0.412 0.101 0.285 0.367 
Neurotic -0.053 0.361 -0.091 0.224 -0.038 0.537 -0.075 0.326 
Returns×Up Dummy 5.727 0.000 9.235 0.000 5.380 0.000 8.696 0.000 
Returns×Down Dummy -2.219 0.000 -3.922 0.000 -0.456 0.006 -2.051 0.000 
Returns×Neurotic×Up 
Dummy -0.504 0.000 -0.516 0.161 -0.486 0.001 -0.431 0.272 
Returns×Neurotic×Down 
Dummy -0.364 0.008 -1.130 0.002 -0.781 0.000 -1.440 0.000 
Marginal R2 1.2%   1.5%   1.2%   1.4%   
Conditional R2 48%   61%   51%   61%   
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Figure 6. Number of logins and daily market returns: The plot illustrates predicted number of logins as a function of daily market returns 
and highlights effects of neuroticism, daily market returns and their significant interaction. The upper line represents those who scored the 
lowest on neuroticism and the lower line represents those who scored the highest on neuroticism.  
 
 
4.4 Weekend monitoring and neuroticism 
Conducting similar analysis as in the weekend monitoring section we find that neurotic investors login 
significantly less on the weekends across all model specification, however there are no interactions of 
neuroticism with market returns (see Table 8).  We also find no interaction of neuroticism with market returns 
for double weekend logins. Given that neuroticism interacts with daily returns on weekdays, future research 
should explore the relationship between trading and the trait of neuroticism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most neurotic 
Least neurotic 
23 
 
Table 8 
        Weekend Logins with Neuroticism  
              
  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2a  Model 2b 
  Poisson P Value Logit P value Poisson P Value logit P value 
(Intercept) -2.287 0.000 -2.696 0.000 -2.248 0.000 -2.640 0.000 
Age 0.008 0.067 0.011 0.026 0.008 0.072 0.011 0.028 
Decision Maker -0.006 0.942 0.008 0.933 -0.005 0.955 0.009 0.926 
Gender (Male) 0.314 0.170 0.443 0.088 0.312 0.174 0.441 0.090 
Income 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.008 
Married -0.186 0.227 -0.166 0.342 -0.187 0.226 -0.168 0.335 
Divorced -0.665 0.012 -0.654 0.029 -0.665 0.012 -0.654 0.029 
Widowed -0.262 0.523 -0.310 0.504 -0.266 0.517 -0.318 0.493 
Cohabitating 0.280 0.206 0.333 0.184 0.277 0.212 0.329 0.190 
Neurotic -0.179 0.016 -0.212 0.011 -0.184 0.013 -0.224 0.008 
Returns×Up Dummy 1.955 0.035 4.293 0.002 
    
Returns×Down Dummy -3.033 0.000 -4.555 0.000 
    Returns×Up 
Dummy×Neurotic 0.053 0.960 0.034 0.984 
    Returns×Down 
Dummy×Neurotic -0.065 0.935 0.637 0.615 
    
Returns 5-day×Up Dummy 
  
-4.735 0.028 -1.867 0.559 
Returns 5-day×Down Dummy 
  
-0.657 0.698 -1.130 0.660 
Returns 5-day×Up Dummy×Neurotic 
  
1.452 0.550 2.701 0.472 
Returns 5-day×Down Dummy×Neurotic   -0.956 0.619 -2.560 0.397 
Marginal R2 2.1%   2.4%   2.1%   2.3% 
Conditional R2 45%   51%   45%   51% 
 
 
 
5. Discussion  
Our findings confirm that, as Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman et al. (2013) have claimed, 
individual investors do indeed selectively monitor their portfolios as a function of market conditions. However, 
our observations differ markedly from those described before. The Vanguard and Swedish Premium Pension 
Authority datasets show that logins increase as returns move from negative to positive, whereas in our dataset 
portfolio monitoring increases as daily market returns move away from zero in either direction, indicating that 
the ostrich metaphor is inappropriate for our data. That is, rather than decrease portfolio monitoring when 
market conditions are negative and increase monitoring when market conditions are positive, we find that our 
sample of investors increased monitoring both when market conditions were positive and when they were 
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negative. We term this phenomenon the meerkat effect to highlight the contrast with the previous observations 
of reduced monitoring (as apocryphal meerkats stick their heads up to look around whenever something 
happens). Our meerkats are logging-in to gain information (either to inform their decision making or for its own 
sake) and, unlike the ostriches from the Vanguard and Swedish Premium Pension Authority data sets, do not 
avoid negative information. This pattern of increased monitoring as a function of both increasing and decreasing 
daily market returns also holds when we consider 5-day and 20-day moving averages for the daily market 
returns.  
Our meerkat effect has an asymmetry, with logins increasing more for positive returns than negative 
returns (the asymmetric V-shape in Figures 3 and 6).  One possible cause of this asymmetry, suggested to us by 
Duane Seppi, is that the differential response to positive and negative market returns might be indicative of two 
effects, one of which masks the other: an effect on information monitoring that increases with changes in market 
returns in either direction and a hidden underlying ostrich effect that somewhat suppresses monitoring when 
returns are negative. Despite the possibility of a latent ostrich effect, in the plots of logins by daily returns there 
is, nonetheless, evidently a clear difference between the login behaviour we report here and that found in the 
earlier studies showing an ostrich effect. For Sicherman et al. (2013, Figure 9) this shows fewer logins when 
returns are negative and more logins when returns are positive. For us, the scatter plot in Figure 3 shows more 
logins for increasing positive and increasing negative returns. Even accepting that there may be an underlying 
ostrich effect in our data leaves substantial differences between the data sets. 
When we exclude those logins that involved trades from our dataset we again observe a meerkat effect 
- increasing non-trade logins for both rising and falling markets - for immediate (daily) returns. However, for 
returns over a longer (5-day) time periods we found a different pattern for non-trade logins - they reduced for 
negative weekly market returns – an ostrich effect. Nonetheless we again consistently observed statistically 
significant meerkat-like increasing logins with both up and down Friday market returns for weekend and double 
weekend logins when the markets are closed and investors cannot trade. Clearly the portfolio monitoring 
behavior observed here is qualitatively quite different to that observed by Karlsson et al. (2009) confirmed by 
Sicherman et al. (2013). 
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While there are differences between our data set and the Vanguard and Swedish Premium Pension 
Authority datasets, we all find that portfolio monitoring varies in relation to market movements. If, as Karlsson 
et al. (2009) and Sicherman et al. (2013) argued, the cause of variation in portfolio monitoring is psychological 
in nature then we might expect to see some association with psychological characteristics of our investors. 
Consistent with this rationale we find that the personality trait of neuroticism accounts for the behavioral 
heterogeneity on an individual basis and interacts with daily market returns in predicting investors’ portfolio 
monitoring decisions. The more neurotic investors generally login less often than their less neurotic counterparts 
but, more interestingly, neuroticism interacts with the observed variation in logins with daily market returns. 
Investors generally increased their logins for negative market returns but neurotic investors increased their 
logins more than non-neurotic investors. For positive market returns, as described above, investors also 
generally increased their logins but neurotics were less responsive and increased their logins more gently than 
non-neurotic investors.  These findings corroborate the notion of Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman et al. 
(2013) that variation in portfolio monitoring is attributable to psychological factors – and this can be understood 
in terms of the different utility that different individuals may experience from any anxiety arising from 
contemplating portfolio performance.  
Although our investigation focuses on the same behaviors as those studied by Karlsson et al. (2009) 
and Sicherman et al. (2013), we have noted that there are a number of differences between the datasets. Such 
results could be due to differences between the samples studied across the two studies – the Karlsson et al. 
(2009) and Sicherman et al.’s (2013) samples consisted of Swedish and USA nationals investing in their own 
pensions, which might perhaps entail more critical investments and with different time horizons than was at 
stake for the present sample who were not directly investing for their pensions and may have been involved in 
more discretionary trades.  A clear difference in the behavior of the samples is evident when we compare the 
daily proportion of logins across the different datasets. From Karlsson et al.’s paper we can infer that the 
proportion of daily logins in the US dataset was about 2% and for the Swedish data was about 0.2% (Karlsson et 
al. Table 1), while in our sample the daily login base-rate is 37%.  
Although Karlsson et al. (2009) and Sicherman et al. (2013) gave evidence in support of the rationale 
for observing an ostrich effect there is also evidence, cited by these authors, that people will sometimes hasten 
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the experience of unpleasant experiences.  In the introduction we referred to the study by Berns et al. (2006) 
who observed that people preferred more pain - a higher voltage shock - in order to reduce the time they spent 
dreading an impending shock.  Of course the circumstances of this study are rather different to those of investors 
exhibiting the ostrich or meerkat effects. Nonetheless it may be that our investors who were likely trading over 
shorter time horizons than the Vanguard and Swedish Premium Pension Authority investors were more likely to 
feel that they should get any bad news over with; while the Vanguard and Swedish Premium Pension Authority 
investors, trading for their pensions, might have felt more able to defer monitoring poor portfolio performance 
in the short term.   
The present study is not the only research finding at variance with the ostrich effect. Brown and Kagel 
(2009) used a trading laboratory experiment to test participants’ information acquisition behavior. In their 
experiment participants chose one of twenty stocks to hold in 8 trials with 20 periods in each trial. At the end of 
each round participants were given the performance of their chosen stock and an option to view the past 
performance of the other nineteen stocks. Consistent with selective avoidance of negative information, the 
authors expected investors with losing stock to ignore the performance of other stocks that were not chosen so 
as to avoid the fear and the regret associated with learning that they made the wrong investment.  However, their 
results indicate that, when holding a declining stock, a majority of participants sought more information about 
the performance of the other stocks they could have invested into; but when holding a winning stock, only a 
minority of participants chose to look at the performance of the other un-chosen stocks. 
In Brown and Kagel’s experiment, for a majority of decisions, participants chose to ignore information 
that could potentially have led to higher earnings. Plainly, this trade-off of the informational value of 
information against its hedonic impact raises questions about the implications of this phenomenon for financial 
practice. In relation to the financial markets Caplin and Leahy (2001) have even incorporated anxiety into the 
expected utility model and argued that it could account for the equity premium puzzle (Mehra & Prescott 1985; 
Benartzi & Thaler 1995). Similarly, Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman and ter Weel (2008) highlight the 
importance of personality in predicting various social and economic outcomes including the labour market, 
crime, educational attainment, schooling decisions, health and longevity, and suggest that personality traits 
should be incorporated into conventional economic models. Likewise, we have shown the role of individual 
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differences and their importance in information acquisition decisions. With regards to financial markets, 
inconsistent information acquisition will be reflected in prices; consequently understanding fully how people 
respond to information is clearly vital to being able to predict prices and dynamics of the financial markets and 
the economy. 
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